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COMMENT
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, THE FOR THE
PEOPLE ACT, AND BRNOVICH: SYSTEMIC
RACISM AND VOTING RIGHTS IN 2021
Joseph Palandrani* and Danika Watson**
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court held racial gerrymandering unconstitutional in
1960 in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,1 striking down the bizarrely redrawn
congressional boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama: a twenty-eightsided figure that removed virtually all Black voters from within the city limits
and placed them outside the city limits—without removing a single white
voter.2 Nevertheless, as states across the country redraw legislative district
lines that disenfranchise minorities and perpetuate systemic racism, the legal
doctrine protecting against racial discrimination in gerrymandering remains
fraught. In the spring of 2021, minority voting power is both championed
and attacked in Congress and in the Supreme Court of the United States. The
For the People Act of 2021,3 passed by the House of Representatives in early
March 2021, promises to restore the strength of the Voting Rights Act of
19654 by expressly banning partisan gerrymandering.5 If passed, the For the
People Act would provide the first federal statutory cause of action for voters
to bring claims challenging partisan gerrymandering. Meanwhile, at the
Court, Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee6 raises challenges to § 2
of the Voting Rights Act,7 a tool historically used to challenge racially
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law.
** J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law. The authors prepared this piece
as part of the Fordham Law Review Online series on systemic racism in the law. We thank
Professor Brenner Fissell for his thought-provoking article and our colleagues at the Fordham
Law Review—particularly Leili Saber, Kevin Sette, Abigail Sia, and William Council—for
creating and supporting this opportunity.
1. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
2. Id. at 341.
3. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.)
5. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 2403(b).
6. No. 19-1257 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021).
7. 52 U.S.C. § 10301. This Comment uses “Voting Rights Act” to refer to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.
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discriminatory redistricting, by threatening its ability to protect minority
voting power and potentially legitimizing highly restrictive election laws that
disproportionately impact marginalized Black, Indigenous, and other people
of color (BIPOC) communities.
In the spring of 2021, minority voting rights are at stake. This Comment
begins with Part I, a brief primer on the current state of U.S. legal doctrine
around race, redistricting, and representation that precipitated the For the
People Act (particularly the sections that comprise the Redistricting Reform
Act8) and that are implicated in Brnovich. Then, Part II.A explains the
imaginary line between partisan and racial gerrymandering that the For the
People Act seeks to eradicate. State legislatures and redistricting
commissions draw district lines with significant racialized impact under the
banner of “partisan gerrymandering,” which the Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional on nonjusticiability grounds under the political question
doctrine in 2019 in Rucho v. Common Cause.9 Under the guise of a
permissible partisan purpose, these district lines deprive minority citizens of
equal voting power, perpetuating and entrenching racial power imbalances.
Part II.B introduces § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the provision challenged
in Brnovich. This Part then presents historical successes in challenging and
deterring racial gerrymandering using § 2. It proceeds to outline § 2’s
weaknesses in protecting minority voting strength and combating minority
voter suppression after the Supreme Court struck down its sister provision—
§ 5—in 2013 in Shelby County v. Holder.10
Part III outlines several of the current “open questions” on minority voting
power and redistricting raised by Brnovich and the Redistricting Reform Act
of 2021. First, this Part charts the relationship between Brnovich—a Voting
Rights Act vote denial case—and redistricting, which gives rise to Voting
Rights Act vote dilution claims. This Part shows that the Court may use
Brnovich to limit the reach of its vote dilution precedents, thereby potentially
weakening § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Next, this Part outlines the
important features of the Redistricting Reform Act, which passed the House
in March 2021 as part of the For the People Act. With detailed mechanisms
for restricting partisan gamesmanship in congressional districting and strong
remedial provisions, the Act shows a promising way out of entrenched,
nonjusticiable disenfranchisement.
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND HAPPENING ALL THE TIME
Racial gerrymandering has been unconstitutional since the Supreme
Court’s Gomillion decision in 1960.11 Yet even today, states redistrict in
ways that dilute minority voting power and entrench systemic racism, while

8.
9.
10.
11.

H.R. 1, 117th Cong. §§ 2400–2435.
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
570 U.S. 529 (2013).
Id. at 347–48.
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the broader legal doctrine around gerrymandering, race, and representation
is pervasively unsettled.12
Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional.13 But it still happens.14 In
2019, the Court reinforced the constitutionality of “political” gerrymandering
in Rucho,15 preserving an easy defense for racial gerrymandering by allowing
legislatures to redistrict in ways that dilute the voting power of racial
minorities in the many districts across the nation where race and political
party affiliation are closely tied, if the legislature justifies redistricting on
political affiliation grounds.16
A. Redistricting
States redraw their congressional and state legislative district maps every
ten years after the U.S. Census provides new population demographic data.17
12. See Girardeau A. Spann, Gerrymandering Justiciability, 108 GEO. L.J. 981, 1009
(2020) (“In a time of increasing cultural diversity in the United States—a time when whites
will soon cease to constitute a numerical majority of the population—the Court appears to
have gerrymandered the law of justiciability in a way that facilitates the efforts of whites to
preserve the current advantage they have over racial minorities in the domain of electoral
politics.”); Emily K. Dalessio, Note, Say the Magic Words: Establishing a Historically
Informed Standard to Prevent Partisanship from Shielding Racial Gerrymanders from
Federal Judicial Review, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1907, 1954–55 (2020) (“Had the Rucho
Court started with a presumption of racial gerrymandering, this evidence would likely have
been sufficient for the Court to uphold that presumption, even in the face of the State’s
evidence that the map was governed by race-neutral partisan districting principles. Thus,
under this test the 2016 map would have been subject to the strict racial gerrymandering
analysis . . . rather than being dismissed as a political question.”); Kyle Keraga, Note, Drawing
the Line: A First Amendment Framework for Partisan Gerrymandering in the Wake of Rucho
v. Common Cause, 79 MD. L. REV. 798, 799–800 (2020) (“Rucho . . . declared that partisan
gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question . . . despite a longstanding
acknowledgement that extreme gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with [our] democratic
principles’—over the years, assorted Justices from both parties have criticized
gerrymandering as everything from ‘cherry-pick[ing] voters,’ to ‘rigging elections,’ to a
subversion of ‘the core principle of republican government . . . that the voters should choose
their representatives, not the other way around.’”)\.
13. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that a racial gerrymander affecting Black
voters violated the Due Process and Equal Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as the right to vote in the Fifteenth Amendment).
14. See Michael Li, The Redistricting Landscape, 2021–22, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/redistrictinglandscape-2021-22 [https://perma.cc/89XB-XNGV] (detailing current and ongoing risks for
gerrymandering and unfair map drawing); Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Just., 2021–22
Redistricting Cycle Poses High Risk of Racial Discrimination in the South, New Projections
Show (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/2021-22redistricting-cycle-poses-high-risk-racial-discrimination-south
[https://perma.cc/3XRXW9TC] [hereinafter Brennan Ctr. Press Release] (identifying redistricting risk factors and
locations currently prone to racial gerrymandering).
15. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2488–89 (2019).
16. See Sara Tofighbakhsh, Note, Racial Gerrymandering After Rucho v. Common
Cause: Untangling Race and Party, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1885, 1900–01 (2020)
(demonstrating the inextricable intertwining between race and party).
17. Who Draws the Maps?: Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/whodraws-maps-legislative-and-congressional-redistricting
[https://perma.cc/27RV-JXQX]
(surveying all fifty states’ approaches to redistricting).
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Historically, each state determines who designs the district maps, resulting
in a wide variety of districting authorities that includes: state legislatures,
which may propose districts through regular legislation; advisory
commissions that consist of legislators or nonlegislators who recommend
redistricting plans to the legislature; independent commissions; political
appointee commissions; political commissions consisting entirely of
incumbent lawmakers; backup commissions that draw maps in cases of
legislative deadlock or a governor’s veto; and single district states that have
only one congressional district.18 When districts are drawn such that their
voting populations tilt in favor of one party and gain or retain one party’s
political power, these districts are “gerrymandered.”19
B. Gerrymandering
The portmanteau term “gerrymandering” arose in 1812 after
Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry drew salamander-shaped state
legislative districts that favored Democratic-Republicans over Federalists.20
Over the ensuing two hundred years, gerrymandering’s strategically wriggly
district-drawing has become a critical feature of the political apparatus,
allowing those who control the redistricting processes to secure political
power that goes far beyond pure proportional representation to exceed their
numerical voting strength.21
How are gerrymandered districts drawn? The “[t]wo common forms of
contemporary gerrymandering are: (1) partisan gerrymandering that seeks to
secure electoral advantages for one’s preferred political party, and (2) racial
gerrymandering that seeks to secure electoral advantages for one’s preferred
race.”22 Both partisan and racial gerrymandering strategies give voters in
some districts a stronger voice than voters in others, raising serious
constitutional controversy on questions of vote dilution that strain the
principle of democratic self-governance and the principle of “one person, one
vote.”23 Critically, both partisan and racial gerrymandering have a
disproportionate impact on the voting strength of racial minorities:
purportedly partisan gerrymanders substantially affect voters who are
minorities.24 Moreover, gerrymandering is just one component of a program
18. See id.
19. See Michael Wines, What Is Gerrymandering? And How Does It Work?, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/what-is-gerrymandering.html
[https://perma.cc/PV64-M4DP] (explaining the mechanics of gerrymandering in the weeks
after the Rucho decision).
20. See Spann, supra note 12, at 984.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 984–85.
23. See id.; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–67 (1964) (outlining the “one
person, one vote” principle under the Equal Protection doctrine).
24. See, e.g., China Dickerson, To Attack Systemic Racism at the Root, Look to the State
House, THE HILL (Aug. 21, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/politics/513054-to-attack-systemic-racism-at-the-root-look-to-the-state-house
[https://perma.cc/VEH2-2495] (“[S]ome of the most powerful drivers of structural racism in
America . . . includ[e] voter suppression and partisan gerrymandering.”). See generally Kim
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of voter suppression driven primarily by state legislatures that
disproportionately impacts voters of color and also includes restrictions and
barriers like voter identification laws, voter purges, aggressive pushes to
close polls in communities of color, and felon disenfranchisement.25
C. Redistricting in 2021
Redistricting’s pressing questions arose yet again this year, not just
because of the controversies surrounding the 2020 federal election and the
2020 Census leading to redistricting,26 but also because of two critical
movements in the legislature and judiciary. The For the People Act, passed
by the House of Representatives in early March 2021, includes the
Redistricting Reform Act which promises to restore the strength of the
Voting Rights Act by expressly banning partisan gerrymandering. If passed,
the For the People Act would establish the first federal statutory cause of
action for voters to bring claims challenging their district lines. Meanwhile,
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee27 calls into question § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act—the tool historically used to challenge racially
discriminatory redistricting—by potentially jeopardizing the section’s
validity while undermining its protections of minority voting power and may
legitimize highly restrictive election laws that disproportionately impact
marginalized BIPOC communities.
Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power, WASH. POST
(June 9, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/09/
how-a-widespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harmthem/ [https://perma.cc/67ND-KTP6]; Olga Pierce & Kate Rabinowitz, ‘Partisan’
Gerrymandering Is Still About Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:48 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/partisan-gerrymandering-is-still-about-race
[https://perma.cc/6ZGV-DX2B].
25. See, e.g., Ankita Rao et al., Is America a Democracy? If So, Why Does It Deny
Millions the Vote?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2019, 6:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/nov/07/is-america-a-democracy-if-so-why-does-it-deny-millions-the-vote
[https://perma.cc/EJZ2-P964] (“Legislators across the country have tightened the
requirements for acceptable forms of identification—this in a country where 7% of Americans
do not have photo IDs, and the number is higher among black and Hispanic populations. In
2016, Wisconsin reinstated strict voter ID laws, ostensibly to fight voter fraud, which experts
have repeatedly found to be almost non-existent.”).
26. See, e.g., Reid J. Epstein & Nick Corasaniti, The Gerrymander Battles Loom, as
G.O.P. Looks to Press Its Advantage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/politics/gerrymander-census-democratsrepublicans.html [https://perma.cc/2A8K-6NK7] (“While partisan warfare on Capitol Hill
draws most of the national attention, the battles over redistricting are among the fiercest and
most consequential in American government. Reapportionment and redistricting occurs every
10 years after the census . . . . The balance of power established by gerrymandering can give
either party an edge that lasts through several election cycles; court challenges—even if
successful—can take years to unwind those advantages.”); David A. Lieb, Redistricting Power
at Stake in 2020 Legislative Elections, AP NEWS (Jan. 11, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/db1ad1c1d335599b579f90262ee0e537 [https://perma.cc/2YT3FJUG] (“‘We’ve got the next 10 years of politics at stake in these elections,’ said Patrick
Rodenbush, communications director for the National Democratic Redistricting
Committee.”).
27. No. 19-1257 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021).
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As discussed later in Part III, these principles underlie the key “open
questions” on minority voting power and redistricting raised by the
Redistricting Reform Act and Brnovich. These questions concern the
relationship between redistricting and vote dilution under the Voting Rights
Act, the road ahead for redistricting reform that insists on independent
redistricting commissions and rejects both racial and partisan
gerrymandering, and the artificial distinction between them.
II. RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION
This Part presents a brief primer on the current state of U.S. legal doctrine
surrounding race, redistricting, and representation that precipitated the For
the People Act and that are implicated in Brnovich. Redistricting
commissions continue to draw lines with significant racial impact under the
banner of “partisan gerrymandering,” which the Court held to be
constitutional on nonjusticiable political question grounds in Rucho.28 These
purportedly partisan lines deprive minority citizens of equal voting power
and of voting’s expressive and associative functions, perpetuating and
entrenching racial power imbalances. Finally, this Part describes the
questions of race, redistricting, and representation raised in the Redistricting
Reform Act of 2021 and Brnovich.
A. Why Do We Need Redistricting Reform?
The Redistricting Reform Act of 2021, one component of the For the
People Act sweeping electoral reform package,29 proposes a fundamental
overhaul of the states’ approaches to redistricting by implementing clear
national standards. Its proposals include both mandating the use of
independent redistricting commissions and prohibiting the use of any map
that discriminates against minorities or that unduly favors or disfavors a
political party.30 These reforms directly confront the Court’s 2019 ruling in
Rucho, which held that, unlike racial gerrymandering claims, partisan
gerrymandering claims are outside a federal court’s jurisdiction because they
present nonjusticiable political questions.31
Rucho establishes that
redistricting bodies can create voting districts with the predominant intent of
achieving a particular political composition.32 While overtly racial
gerrymanders drawn predominantly on lines of race had already been held
28. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498–99 (2019).
29. See G. Michael Parsons, The Peril and Promise of Redistricting Reform in H.R.1,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2021), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-peril-and-promiseof-redistricting-reform-in-h-r-1/ [https://perma.cc/JX7W-9ZE2].
30. See Ronald Brownstein, The GOP Cheat Code to Winning Back the House: The
Stakes for Democrats’ Election-Reform Plan Couldn’t be Higher, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/02/democrats-need-hr-1-and-new-vraprotect-party/617987/ [https://perma.cc/SP7D-89JW] (evaluating H.R. 1’s redistricting
provisions and highlighting the partisan gerrymander prohibition’s connections to election
reform trends in state law).
31. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506.
32. Id. at 2506–07.
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both justiciable and unconstitutional,33 Rucho has created an impenetrable
thicket that complicates analyzing redistricting cases for districts in which
racial identity and political affiliation are closely intertwined.34
B. Rucho’s Defense of Partisan Gerrymandering
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, writing for the five Republican-appointed
Justices of the Supreme Court forming the majority in Rucho, rejected the
Court’s ability to review a partisan gerrymandering claim because such
claims present “political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts,”35
which “have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the
absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide [them] in the
exercise of such authority.”36 In other words, Rucho construes partisan
gerrymandering as nonjusticiable because of the lack of workable standards
to guide the courts.37
C. Rucho’s Imaginary Line Between Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering
The position that the Court adopted in Rucho in 2019 had previously been
widely criticized for drawing an impracticable and arguably artificial bright
line between partisan gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering.38 Where
racial identity and party affiliation are closely intertwined, Rucho forces
federal courts to make logically impossible determinations about whether
race or party drives the gerrymander.39 As Professor Girardeau A. Spann has
written, the Rucho decision on justiciability doctrines in gerrymandering
“protects the political power of white voters” by “allowing white
Republicans to dilute the political power of minority Democrats.”40 Spann
notes that the Court clearly acknowledged the strong correlation between

33. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644–45 (1993); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960).
34. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495–96.
35. Id. at 2506–07.
36. Id. at 2508.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA.
L. REV. 365, 381 (2015) (“The intersection of race and party makes the search for a
predominant motive impossible.”).
39. See Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, The Gerrymandering Decision Drags the Supreme
Court
Further
into
the
Mud,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/opinion/gerrymandering-rucho-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/3XEW-2CT6]; Meaghan Winter, Opinion, Want to Dismantle Structural
Racism in the US? Help Fight Gerrymandering, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2020, 6:27 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/21/gerrymandering-republicans-uselection-structural-racism [https://perma.cc/2LBJ-QX4Z] (“The US supreme court [sic] has
prohibited explicit racial gerrymanders but has declined to ban gerrymanders that effectively
achieve the same outcome.”).
40. See Spann, supra note 12, at 982–84 (arguing that “whites will derive a net benefit
from treating racial gerrymanders as justiciable. And by gerrymandering the line that
separates justiciable from nonjusticiable claims, the Supreme Court will have succeeded in
helping whites to preserve the political advantage that they have over racial minorities.”).
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race and political affiliation in Department of Commerce v. New York.41
There, the Court rejected the Trump administration’s proposal to add a
citizenship question to the 2020 Census, holding that the administration’s
self-proclaimed interest in compliance with the Voting Rights Act was
“contrived” and “pretextual” and that the administration poorly concealed its
true, underlying motivation to use the citizenship question to facilitate
electoral redistricting.42 The analysis in Department of Commerce indicates
that the Court recognizes the close entanglement between race and partisan
political affiliation in the electoral districting context.43
Yet in Rucho the Court found no such entanglement, drawing an illusory
bright line between political and racial gerrymandering on the very same day
that it handed down Department of Commerce.44 Yet, like in the 2020
Census case, the Court in Rucho reviewed evidence suggesting an insidious
racial motivation: the district court decision had revealed that the primary
mapmaker, tasked by the state legislature to remedy an earlier redistricting
that had been determined to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, was
explicitly instructed by Republican state legislators to use granular political
data to “‘change as few’ of the district lines . . . as possible in remedying the
racial gerrymander.”45 Moreover, the mapmaker created detailed maps that
“tracked race, voting patterns and addresses of tens of thousands of North
Carolina college students” and drew a congressional district line that divided
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University—the largest
historically Black college in the nation—“so precisely that it all but
guarantees it will be represented in Congress by two Republicans for years
to come.”46

41. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
42. See id. at 2575–76.
43. See id.; see also Spann, supra note 12, at 995–96 (noting that “[t]he correlation
between race and political affiliation is particularly strong in the electoral context, as
evidenced . . . in Department of Commerce,” and further noting that “[p]ress coverage
indicated that, although the stated reason for adding the question was to facilitate enforcement
of the Voting Rights Act, the real reason was to facilitate the drawing of election districts that
would enhance the voting strength of white Republicans by reducing the voting strength of
Latinx residents who were likely to support Democratic candidates” (citing Tara Bahrampour,
GOP Strategist and Census Official Discussed Citizenship Question, New Documents Filed
by Lawyers Suggest, WASH. POST (June 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-mdva/2019/06/15/new-documents-suggest-direct-connection-between-republican-redistrictingstrategist-census-bureau-official-over-citizenship-question/?utm_term=.fb19ad03c406
[https://perma.cc/M8SS-CFL2] (writing that expert map strategist and advisor Thomas
“Hofeller had also done a study in 2015 that concluded a citizenship question on the census
would result in a structural electoral advantage for Republicans and non-Hispanic whites.”)) .
44. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Dep’t of Com., 139
S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
45. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 805 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
46. See Dalessio, supra note 12, at 1954 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1954–55 (“Had
the Rucho Court started with a presumption of racial gerrymandering, this evidence would
likely have been sufficient for the Court to uphold that presumption, even in the face of the
State’s evidence that the map was governed by race-neutral partisan districting principles.
Thus, under this test the 2016 map would have been subject to the strict racial gerrymandering
analysis . . . rather than being dismissed as a political question.” (citations omitted)).
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The Rucho problem of distinguishing race from political party arises in an
era of hyper-partisanship amplified in the districting process by highly
sophisticated software and demographic data tools that enable districts to be
drawn with exacting precision for anyone seeking a political advantage—
whether racial, partisan, or both.47 Precision redistricting, a multimilliondollar enterprise driven by advanced mapmaking software and terabytes of
voting data, escalates the level of demographic knowledge and control that
redistricting authorities may exert during the redistricting process.48
With sitting lawmakers and other partisan affiliates drawing maps in many
states and powerful incentives to tilt the playing field toward maintaining and
expanding incumbents’ political reach,49 the majority’s position in Rucho
further limits the judiciary’s ability to intervene in the next wave of
gerrymanders that have the potential to further diminish voting power for
racial minorities. This strengthens the defense of partisanship even in those
cases where district lines trace racial demographics and diminish minority
voting power.50 The Brennan Center for Justice identified the 2021–2022
redistricting round as likely to be particularly detrimental to communities of
color, particularly in the South where historic features like single-party
control of the redistricting process and weaker legal protections for
communities of color meet new challenges of fast population growth and
demographic change.51
In the face of these challenges, several states have implemented
redistricting reform measures that may inform the aims and successes of the
proposed federal plan; examples include the independent commissions
introduced in Michigan and Colorado that will draw both congressional and
legislative maps independent of the state legislatures, advisory commissions
in New York and Utah, and a bipartisan commission introduced in Virginia.52
These successes of state legislative action signal the possibility of broader
reform that can target the hyper-partisanship shaping the redistricting process
which perpetuates systemic racism through vote dilution and entrenchment.
As outlined in Part III, the relationship between vote dilution claims and
redistricting under the Voting Rights Act is currently being challenged at the
47. See generally Rebecca Green, Redistricting Transparency, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1787 (2018) (surveying technological approaches and innovations impacting redistricting);
Spann, supra note 12.
48. See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race:
Advances in Data, Computing, and Fundraising Have Given Politicians New Power to
Gerrymander
Democracy
Away,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
28,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technology-redmap2020/543888/ [https://perma.cc/Z6LQ-RAVH] (“Redistricting is the great game of modern
politics, and the arms race for the next decade’s maps promises to be the most extensive—and
most expensive—of all time.”).
49. See Who Draws the Maps?: Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, supra note
17 (surveying all fifty states’ redistricting authorities).
50. See Brennan Ctr. Press Release, supra note 14 (demonstrating how the upcoming
redistricting round is “likely to be the most challenging in recent history and particularly
detrimental to communities of color.”).
51. See id.
52. See id.
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Supreme Court and is expected to probe the connection between redistricting
and other electoral administration measures and procedures that
disproportionately impact the voting rights of communities of color while
also threatening the tenuous status of the Voting Rights Act. Meanwhile, as
discussed in Part IV, the For the People Act amplifies the successes of several
state-level electoral reforms and moves toward a future electoral process that
circumvents Rucho’s unworkable divide between race and politics: the For
the People Act would create the first federal statutory cause of action for
political gerrymandering and mandate independent redistricting
commissions for each state’s redistricting body.
III. BRNOVICH V. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
This term, the Supreme Court, in Brnovich v. Democratic National
Committee, is considering whether two Arizona voting statutes violate the
Voting Rights Act. One of the challenged Arizona laws invalidates any ballot
cast at a polling location outside the voter’s assigned election precinct.53 The
other law prohibits volunteers from collecting ballots from voters’ homes to
deliver them to election authorities for counting.54 Minority voters’ ballots
are invalidated under the out-of-precinct rule at double the rate of white
voters’ ballots, and the policy “has disenfranchised over 38,000 Arizonans
since 2008.”55 Similarly, the ballot collection ban disproportionately impacts
Black, Latinx, and Indigenous voters, who often lack reliable transportation
and mail services and who are, for those reasons and others, more likely than
white voters to submit their ballots with the assistance of volunteer ballot
collectors.56
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in 2020, found that both of Arizona’s
voting restrictions violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.57 Section 2(a) of
the Voting Rights Act prohibits state and local governments from enacting
election-related rules or policies that result in “a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”58
Section 2(b) gives shape to this proscription by defining impermissible rules
as those which give voters of one racial group “less opportunity than other
53. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-122 (LexisNexis 2021) (“No person shall be permitted to
vote unless such person’s name appears as a qualified elector in both the general county
register and in the precinct register . . . .”); id. § 16-584(C) (permitting voting by provisional
ballot where a voter’s name does not appear in a precinct’s voter register only if the voter’s
“residence address [is] within the precinct in which the voter is attempting to vote”).
54. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-1005(H) (“A person who knowingly collects voted or
unvoted early ballots from another person is guilty of a class 6 felony.”). Voters’ ballots may,
however, be collected by such voters’ mail carriers, election officials, family members,
household members, or caregivers. See id. §§ 16-1005(H), 16-1005(I).
55. Brief for Respondents at 2, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (U.S. argued Mar.
2, 2021) (No. 19-1257), 2021 WL 242302 [hereinafter DNC Brief].
56. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1005–07 (9th Cir. 2020) (en
banc), cert. granted sub nom. Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct.
221 (2020) (mem.) and cert. granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S.
Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.).
57. See. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1032, 1037.
58. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
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members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.”59 Alleged violations of this provision of § 2
are assessed based on “the totality of circumstances.”60 In the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis, governments violate § 2 when: (1) their election rules impose a
“disparate burden on members of the protected class” and (2) there is a
“legally significant relationship between the disparate burden on minority
voters and the social and historical conditions affecting them.”61 Because
the disparate impacts of Arizona’s voting restrictions are attributable to “the
social and historical conditions affecting”62 Arizona’s minority citizens—
including, for example, the state’s history of discriminatory voting
practices63 and the effects of past and present discrimination on current
health, educational disparities, and economic disparities64—Arizona’s
restrictions failed the Ninth Circuit’s § 2 test.65
Arizona successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.66 Arizona insists that facially neutral
election laws only violate § 2 if they: (1) result in a “substantial disparate
impact” on minority citizens’ opportunity to vote67 and (2) directly cause
disproportionate outcomes such that “the substantial disparate impact arises
from ‘the state’s actions rather than those of other persons.’”68 If the Ninth
Circuit’s construction of the Voting Rights Act were sanctioned, Arizona
contends that the Voting Rights Act may exceed Congress’s power under the
Reconstruction Amendments69 (as limited by City of Boerne v. Flores70) and
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.71
While the election restrictions challenged in Brnovich are unrelated to
districting, the reach of the Court’s districting jurisprudence is at stake in
Brnovich. This is because the Ninth Circuit’s analysis relied on a leading
Voting Rights Act districting case: Thornburg v. Gingles.72 Challenges to
59. Id. § 10301(b).
60. Id.
61. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1017–26, 1034.
64. See id. at 1027–28, 1034.
65. See id. at 1032, 1037.
66. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.).
67. Brief for State Petitioners at 19, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (U.S. argued
Mar. 2, 2021) (No. 19-1257), 2020 WL 7121776 [hereinafter Arizona Brief].
68. Id. at 24 (quoting Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2020)).
69. See id. at 25–26 (arguing that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional if it
“invalidates facially neutral laws like Arizona’s without evidence of a substantial disparate
impact” because such a proscription would impermissibly expand the right to vote as
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment).
70. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot “make a substantive change”
in the constitutional rights it seeks to protect when it enacts remedial legislation pursuant to
the Reconstruction Amendments).
71. Arizona Brief, supra note 67, at 26–27 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s exacting test
would compel state legislators to enact “overwhelmingly race conscious” voting laws in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
72. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1011–14,
1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (using Gingles to frame the court’s analysis), cert. granted sub
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discriminatory redistricting under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act—such as the
one sustained in Gingles—allege that minority citizens’ votes are diluted;73
by contrast, Arizonans’ votes are not merely diluted but denied if cast in
violation of the contested policies.74 The courts have historically had more
occasion to address claims of vote dilution than claims of outright vote
denial, in part because voting schemes that threatened to disproportionately
deny minorities their votes were often rejected by the federal government
before they could take effect pursuant to the Voting Rights Act’s sinceinvalidated preclearance mechanism.75 For this reason, and because § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act nowhere indicates that different standards ought to be
used to assess vote dilution and vote denial claims,76 the Ninth Circuit looked
to Gingles to guide its evaluation of Arizona’s voting laws.77 The two-part
test adopted by the Ninth Circuit78 derives from Gingles, and Gingles
provides the salient questions a court must ask to make effective use of that
test—including a list of nine context-specific factors enumerated in the
Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act.79 Among other things, those factors include “the extent to which
members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,”
“whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals,” and “whether the policy underlying the . . . voting
[regulations] is tenuous.”80
The parties in Brnovich vigorously contest whether the Gingles test is
appropriate in vote denial cases.81 Arizona even insinuates that the Court
nom. Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020) (mem.), and
cert. granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.).
73. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46–51 (explaining the relationship of districting to
impermissible vote dilution).
74. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012 (“The case now before us involves two vote-denial
claims.”).
75. See id. (explaining that “[t]he jurisprudence of vote-denial claims is relatively
underdeveloped in comparison to vote-dilution claims” because the effectiveness of the
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance system had reduced the need for civil litigants to enforce
vote denial claims until the Court declared the preclearance system unconstitutional in Shelby
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)); see also Brief of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm. (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021) (No. 19-1257), 2021 WL 276500 (“Without the
preclearance requirement, Section 2 is the primary tool for combating racial discrimination in
access to the political process.”).
76. See generally 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
77. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012–13 (citing Gingles to define the appropriate “results test”
to apply to vote denial claims).
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36–37 (1986) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at
28–29 (1982)); Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012–13 (first citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37; then
citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29).
80. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1013.
81. Compare DNC Brief, supra note 55, at 32–33 (arguing that § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act requires the same analysis in vote dilution and vote denial claims), with Arizona Brief,
supra note 67, at 32–33 (arguing that the Court’s framework for analyzing vote dilution claims
is inapposite in vote denial cases).
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should abandon Gingles entirely.82 But Brnovich demonstrates the dangers
of sequestering Gingles’s context-focused analysis in the Court’s § 2
jurisprudence in favor of the strict and formalistic test Arizona presses.83 For
example, using the Gingles analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
campaign in support of Arizona’s ballot collection prohibition was supported
by a racially inflammatory campaign video that baselessly suggested that a
Latino ballot collector engaged in voter fraud.84 While this is a damning fact
under Gingles, which invites courts to ask “whether political campaigns have
been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals,”85 there is no room for
it in Arizona’s narrow inquiry. Moreover, Gingles’s admonition to consider
“whether the policy underlying the . . . voting [regulations] is tenuous”86
encourages judicial skepticism of pretextual justifications for voting
restrictions that impose racially disparate burdens. The Ninth Circuit
demonstrated the power of this component of the Gingles test: picking
through Arizona’s dubious election-integrity rationales for its ballot
collection policy, the court noted that “if some Arizonans today distrust thirdparty ballot collection, it is because of the fraudulent campaign mounted by
proponents” of the law.87 But some of the Justices of the Supreme Court
appear far more credulous of Arizona’s proffered justifications: at oral
argument, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch referred to ballot
collection as ballot “harvesting”88—a “loaded term” adopted by opponents
of the practice89—and pointed to a report that purportedly supported
restrictions on third-party ballot collection.90 If Gingles’s rigorous
“tenuousness” inquiry were relaxed or jettisoned in the manner suggested by
the Justices’ comments and urged by Arizona, the federal courts could lose a
powerful check on discriminatory state voting laws.

82. Arizona alleges Gingles has a “myopic focus on legislative history,” Arizona Brief,
supra note 67, at 33, indicative of a “bygone era of statutory construction.” Id. (quoting Food
Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019)).
83. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (describing Arizona’s reading of § 2).
84. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1009–10, 1028–29.
85. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29
(1982)).
86. Id.
87. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1037.
88. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 65–67, 96, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.
(U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021) (No. 19-1257) [hereinafter Brnovich Transcript] (Chief Justice
Roberts’s references to ballot “harvesting”); id. at 57, 83–84 (Justice Gorsuch’s references to
the same).
89. Amber Phillips, What Is Ballot ‘Harvesting,’ and Why Is Trump So Against It?, WASH.
POST (May 26, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/26/whatis-ballot-harvesting-why-is-trump-so-against-it/ [https://perma.cc/PA63-GLMN] (“Election
experts say ‘harvesting’ is a loaded term . . . .”).
90. See Brnovich Transcript, supra note 88, at 65, 67–68 (Chief Justice Roberts’s
references to the report); id. at 83 (Justice Gorsuch’s references to the same); see also id. at
88, 112 (Justice Kavanaugh’s references to the same).
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Finally, in a colloquy with Justice Kagan, counsel for the Arizona
Republican Party91 suggested that under his context-insensitive
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, a state or local government could
lawfully cancel early voting on Sundays—even if evidence showed that
Black citizens vote on Sundays at ten times the rate of white citizens.92 While
Justice Kagan posed this scenario as a hypothetical, its implications are real
and concrete: just this year, Georgia Republicans considered restricting early
voting on Sundays as a means to suppress Black voter turnout.93
When faced with a racially discriminatory districting scheme, the Gingles
Court interpreted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to require a searching, factintensive inquiry to assess disparate-impact claims. If Arizona persuades
today’s Court to limit Gingles’s analysis to vote dilution cases, § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, which has grown in importance since Shelby County,
could be weakened considerably.
IV. THE FOR THE PEOPLE ACT OF 2021
While there is cause for concern about the future of voting rights in the
federal courts, there is some cause for hope that Congress will step in to
strengthen the franchise. The Rucho Court, in emphasizing that Congress
could remedy the wrongs the Court declined to address, observed that “[t]he
first bill introduced in the 116th Congress would require States to create 15member independent commissions”94; a version of that legislation has now
passed the House of Representatives.95 The bill—a piece of the For the
People Act titled the Redistricting Reform Act of 2021—would require
independent state commissions to make congressional redistricting
91. The Arizona Republican Party filed a separate petition for writ of certiorari, which the
Court granted and consolidated with Brnovich. See Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020) (mem.).
92. See Brnovich Transcript, supra note 88, at 24–25.
93. See Nick Corasaniti & Jim Rutenberg, In Georgia, Republicans Take Aim at Role of
Black
Churches
in
Elections,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
6,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/us/politics/churches-black-voters-georgia.html
[https://perma.cc/NF7T-LJ4W] (describing the historical relationship between churchaffiliated early voting on Sundays and Black political mobilization and explaining how a bill
that passed the Georgia House of Representatives in March 2021 would limit such voting).
But see Nick Corasaniti, Georgia G.O.P. Passes Major Law to Limit Voting Amid Nationwide
Push, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/us/politics/georgiavoting-law-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/HX6D-XA3K] (reporting that the version of
the Georgia bill that ultimately became law, while deeply restrictive, does not include
restrictions on Sunday voting). For the text of the restrictive law Georgia recently enacted,
see Election Integrity Act, 2021 Ga. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 9 (LexisNexis). For a
thorough contextual analysis of the Georgia law’s most consequential provisions, see Nick
Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, What Georgia’s Voting Law Really Does, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2021, 2:51 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/02/us/politics/georgia-voting-lawannotated.html [https://perma.cc/X49T-DKNA].
94. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
95. See Nicholas Fandos, Targeting State Restrictions, House Passes Landmark Voting
Rights
Expansion,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
3,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/us/politics/house-voting-rights-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/MR85-DH89]. See generally H.R. 1, 117th Cong. §§ 2400–2435 (2021).
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decisions.96 These commissions would be convened in part by “Nonpartisan
Agenc[ies]” established within each state’s legislature.97 Such agencies
would choose the first six members of each commission;98 those six members
would in turn appoint nine more99 for a total of fifteen members per
commission.100 Any registered voter who has not changed parties within
three years,101 has no immediate familial political ties,102 and has not violated
federal election law103 may apply to be on a state commission.104
The Redistricting Reform Act is a meticulously detailed piece of
legislation. It prescribes standards for each commission’s day-to-day
operations,105 sets deadlines for the selection of commission members,106
and lays out the procedures by which the commission is to engage the public
in the districting process.107 But its broad provisions are likely its most
significant.
The bill requires, for example, that districts “respect
communities of interest, neighborhoods, and political subdivisions”108 and
deems district lines unlawful if, under the “totality of circumstances,” it is
evident that they “unduly favor[] or disfavor[] a political party.”109
Reiterating the protections of the Voting Rights Act, the Redistricting
Reform Act would require each congressional district to “provide racial,
ethnic, and language minorities with an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process and to elect candidates of choice.”110 And these
statutory guarantees are backed by a strong remedial framework: private
rights of action would be available to anyone “aggrieved” by failures to
adhere to the bill’s requirement,111 and such actions would be heard by threejudge panels112 whose decisions would be directly appealable to the Supreme
Court on an expedited basis.113
As racially discriminatory voting policies have taken cover behind the thin
veil of professed partisan motivation, the Court has declined to take remedial
action. Meanwhile, precedents like Gingles that could equip courts to
grapple with the racial impacts of facially neutral but effectively unequal
election rules are embattled. With the Voting Rights Act and the Equal
Protection Clause less likely to adequately safeguard minority voters, further
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 2401(a)(1) (2021).
Id. § 2414(a).
Id. § 2411(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 2411(a)(1).
Id. § 2412(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 2412(a)(2)(A)–(D), (F).
Id. § 2412(a)(2)(E).
Id. § 2412(a)(1).
See id. § 2411(b).
See id. § 2411(a)(1)(A)–(B).
See id. § 2413(b)–(d).
Id. § 2413(a)(1)(D).
Id. § 2413(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 2413(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 2432(a)(2).
Id. § 2432(b)(2).
Id. § 2432(b)(5).
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legislation is necessary to fill the void. By joining the Voting Rights Act’s
protections for minority voting power with new restrictions on parties’
opportunities to tilt the playing field in their favor, the Redistricting Reform
Act provides a promising response to the enduring racism that infects
American election law.

